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TORTS
GEORGE SAVAGE KING*
The South Carolina Torts cases decided by the courts dur-
ing the period of this review will be discussed under five
headings. None involved any new or changed principle of
law, but the Supreme Court reiterated that in South Carolina
it is libellous per se to call a white person a Negro and stated
unequivocally that a cause of action for invasion of privacy
is recognized in this state.
Right of Privacy
In Meetze v. Associated Press1 the Court weighed the in-
terest of the public in news items against the right of the
plaintiff to maintain her privacy. They found the fact that
the 12 year old plaintiff gave birth to a normal baby, born
in wedlock, to be of sufficient news interest to warrant the
defendant's publication of the facts over the protest of the
plaintiff and her husband. This conclusion was supported
by the fact that the vital statistics as to the birth and mother's
age were required by law to be recorded as a public record.
A.lthough the Court was critical of the conduct of the defend-
ant in obtaining its information, it could not find the publi-
cation of it an unwarranted invasion of plaintiff's right. For
a thorough discussion of the case see 9 S. C. L. Q. 636.
Defamation
In Bowen v. Independent Publishing Co. 2 the Court reiter-
ated its earlier holdings that it is libel per se in South Carolina
to write of a white person that she is a Negro. What the im-
plications of the Segregation Cases might be in such a situ-
ation is discussed, as well as other facets of the problem, in a
case note in 7 S. C. L. Q. 472. It is regretted that the Court
did not make reference to this excellent article in its citation
of authorities.
In Rogers v. Florence Printing Co.3 it was held that plain-
tiff's allegation that defendant had orally acknowledged that
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 230 S. C. 330, 95 S. E. 2d 606 (1956).
2. 230 S. C. 509, 96 S. E. 2d 564 (1957).
3. 230 S. C. 304, 95 S. E. 2d 616 (1956).
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the libellous story it had published was of and concerning
plaintiff, did not state a cause of action for slander and,
therefore, there was no improper joining of an action for
slander with the action for libel.
Joint Tort Feasor
Fleming v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co.4 stated the well estab-
lished rule that: " . . . where different persons owe the
same duty, and their acts naturally tend to the same breach
of that duty, the wrong may be regarded as joint, and both
may be held liable." 5 Plaintiff had joined three defendants,
all wholesalers or jobbers of kerosene who had handled the
liquid which plaintiff purchased from a retail grocery. Plain-
tiff's intestate had died as a result of an explosion when
she used the liquid in a kerosene stove.
Negligence
In Barnett v. C. & W. C. Ry. Co.6 and Scott v. Sou. Ry. Co.,7
the Court held that the evidence of negligence was sufficient
to go to the respective juries and refused to upset their ver-
dicts for the plaintiffs. In the former case the defendant
appellant contended the trial court should have directed a
verdict for defendant railroad because of the evidence of
gross negligence by plaintiff truck driver in the crossing
accident. In the latter case the defendant appellant contended
the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict for de-
fendant when its train ran down plaintiff's car, which had
stalled in a hole at a railroad crossing, after failing to heed
the signals of plaintiff's wife who was some 175 steps up
the track from the crossing waving a flashlight. The Court
also overruled defendant's contention that the last clear chance
doctrine was not applicable.
In Scott v. Meek s the Court reversed the granting of an
involuntary non-suit after finding there was evidence to go
to the jury on the issue of defendant's negligence resulting
in an auto collision with plaintiff's auto while plaintiff was
traversing a dual lane highway.
4. 231 S. C. 42, 97 S. E. 2d 76 (1957).
5. Id. p. 78.
6. 230 S. C. 525, 96 S. E. 2d 555 (1957).
7. 231 S. C. 28, 97 S. E. 2d 73 (1957).
8. 230 S. C. 310, 95 S. E. 2d 619 (1956).
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Howle v. Woods9 affirmed a judgment for the defendant
involved in an auto accident when plaintiff turned left without
giving a signal while defendant was passing without having
sounded his horn. The issue of whose negligence was the
proximate cause of the damages of plaintiff was for the
jury.
In Farrell v. Weinard'0 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed the District Court's direction of a verdict for
the defendant and denied plaintiff's contention that the last
clear chance doctrine was applicable under the facts of this
case because there was nothing to justify a conclusion "that
the defendant saw or should have seen the plaintiff in a po-
sition of danger in time to avoid the accident."'1 Defendant
was driving at night in the left lane of a dual lane highway
preparatory to turning left when he saw the car ahead swerve
suddenly to avoid plaintiff who, intoxicated, was standing in
the center of the dual lane strip but facing to defendant's
right. Defendant veered to the left to allow more room for
plaintiff, but a moment later plaintiff turned about and ran
in front of defendant in an effort to reach the median strip
between the dual lanes where his "buddy", who was calling
him, was standing.
In Bruin v. Tribble'2 the Court of Appeals reversed the
judgment for the defendant entered by the trial court after
a verdict for the plaintiff by the jury. It was held that plain-
tiff's contributory negligence and the application of the last
clear chance doctrine were properly questions for the jury.
The plaintiff was an elderly woman crossing the street at an
intersection at night when struck down by defendant's slow
moving truck. The Court found there were no circumstances
to prevent either party from seeing the other and that the
plaintiff may have relied on the fact that the defendant saw
her crossing and would so manage his truck as to avoid injur-
ing her.
In Shaw v. A. C. L. Railroad Co.13 the Court of Appeals af-
firmed the District Court's direction of verdicts for both de-
fendant railroads in an action for the wrongful death of
plaintiff's testate who was the conductor of defendant South-
9. 231 S. C. 75, 97 S. E. 2d 205 (1957).
10, 241 F. 2d 562 (4th Cir. 1957).
11. Id. p. 565.
12. 238 F. 2d 12 (4th Cir. 1956).
13. 238 F. 2d 525 (4th Cir. 1956).
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ern Railway Company's train which had stopped at a small
wayside station while named defendant's express passenger
train passed on parallel tracks. Testate had attempted to cross
the tracks in front of the oncoming express train although
he was aware of its approach. The Court found that testate's
action was obvious contributory negligence in going upon the
tracks in the face of the oncoming A. C. L. train. It also
found that even though the application of the Federal Em-
ployer's Liability Act prevents the employee's contributory
negligence from operating as a complete bar to his recovery
against his employer, in this instance, ".... it must be held
that his death was not due to the great speed of the train but
to his own voluntary act."'
14
On petition for a writ of certiorari, the United States Su-
preme Court in a per curiam opinion 15 denied the writ as to
the defendant A. C. L. Railroad, but granted it, reversed and
remanded for trial the cause against the defendant employer,
Southern Railway Company.
Malicious Interference with Contract
The Court of Appeals held that no cause of action existed
at common law for malicious interference by an employer
with a contract between a union and his employees. In
Friendly Society and Engravers and Sketchrmakers v. Calico
Engraving Co.-" the union sought to recover $100,000 dam-
ages allegedly caused by the defendant's activities in persuad-
ing its employees to leave the union after the latter had been
certified by the National Labor Relations Board as the sole
bargaining agent. The Court pointed out that the National
Labor Relations Act as amended by the Labor Management
Relations Act provides exclusive remedies for the violation
of the rights protected by those acts.
14. Id. p. 528.
15. 77 S. Ct. 680 (1957).
16. 238 F. 2d 521 (1956).
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